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Anytheory ofnaturallanguage semantics musthave some mecha－  
nismtotreatcontext．Thisisparticularlyimportantwhen dealingwith  
referentialexpressionssuchaspronounsanddemonstratives．  
InJapanese，PrObably the most difficult and contentiousisstleis  
how to treatthe so－Called reflexive，jibun．Thisis mainly because the  
referentialrange ofjibuncannotbe accounted for simply by syntactic  
COnStraints and that adding some semantic／pragmatic factors to a  
basicallysyntacticexplanationisinsufficient．Whatis requiredissome  
mechanism thatcan represent“context”properly and can explain how  
plausibilityiscomputed．  
Forthispurpose，attemptSbyArtificialIntelligence researchersto  
formalise the notion of context appear useful．There are several  
different versions oflogics of context and most of them are proh  
positional．Inthispaper，repreSentativetheorieswillbeex左mined a‘nd  
COmPared．  
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2．McCarthy’sIJOgicofContext  





In this framework，COnteXtS are regarded as abstr・aCt，formal  
Objects：theyarealsosaidtobe“Yichobjects，1ikesituationsinsituation  
calculus”（McCarthyandBuvae，1997，15）butnoexplicationisoffered  
as to whatis meantbythis．Hence，Ishallonly presenthowthisloglC  




Oneimportantnotioninthistheoryis tnnscendimgcontexts，Which  
makesit possible to account for more than one subjects．Thisis  
representedasc’：ist（c，P）：i．e．thepropositionpisinthecontextc，and  
thisis assertedin an outer context c’．In addition，in order to explain  
r’efer’enCerelationsinmultiplecontexts，itisnecessaryto enterand exit  
contexts．The outer contextis cO，andifcO：ist（c，P），by enteringthe  
COnteXt C，itcanbeinferred that c：少And by reversingthe process，if  
wehavec：P，WeCaninfercO：ist（c，P）byEXITingthecontextc．  
I』1allmerely point out at this stage that the notion of‘outer  
context’・（i；e．cOinMcCarthy andBuvae（1997））seems an appropriate  
meanstorepresentthepossibilityofjibunreferrlngtOthespeakerofa  
glVen utteranCe．Another usefu1featureisits capacity of a1lowlng tO   
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use differentvocabulariesin different contexts；We Shallcome back to  
thispointshortly．   
3．Attardi＆Simi（1993）  
Attardiand Simi（1993）explicate viewpoints using a reflective  
first orderlogic thatis proved to be consistent．In this framework，a  
Viewpointis seen as a setofsentences thatrepresentthe assumptions  
ofatheory．Thus，intheirnotation，in（‘A’，呼）meansthatasentenceA  
is entailed by the assumptions denoted by a viewpoint expression t4）．  
Belief，reflection，truth and knowiedge（＝true belief）are defined as  
follows（AttardiandSimi，1993，p．15f．）：  
BELIEF  Bel（g，A）＝in（A，呼（g））wheregisanagent．  
Reflection in（A，咋）⇒（vp⇒A）  
TRUTH：   True（A）＝in（A，RW）where RWis a special  






Itshould be clear from the above thattruthis relativein this theory．  
Provabilityin a viewpointis called holdingin a situation，Whichis  
representedas：Hold（A，S）＝in（A，t4）（s）），Wheresisasituation，anda  
viewpointt4）（s），Whichisasetofbasicfactswhichdefinethesituation．  
With this mechanism，Attardiand Simican represent contexts  
withviewpointasist（c，P）＝in（夕，C）．This，however，doesnota1low  
differencesin vocabulariesin different contexts，Whichis a1lowedin  
McCarthy’stheory．  
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4．GhidiniandGiunehigli孔（2001＆2002）  
GhidiniandGiunchiglia（2001；2002）advocateaframeworkcal1ed  
LocalModels Semantics（LMS）．In this system，a COnteXtis seen as a  
partialandapproximaterepresentationoftheworldfromsomeagent’s  
perspective：i．e．it does not belong to the realworld，aSit were，but  
representstheworldfromsomeindividual’sviewpoint・Thus，reaSOning  
is partialin a sense thatitonlyinvoIves a subsetoftheindividual’s  
knowledge and also thatnot allinference patterns willbe used．This  
does notmean，however，thatdifferentcontexts are unrelated．Ghidini  
andGiunchglia’s argumentisthats11Chrelationshipsbetweendifferent  
contexts are deemed to be partialand we cannot fully‘translate’one  
contextinto another：a Single representation of the realworldisin  
principlenotfeasible．  
Suchintuitionsarestatedastwoprinciples：  
Principlel（of Locality）：reaSOning uses only part of whatis  
potentially available（e．g．，Whatis known，the availableinference  
procedures）．Thepartbeingusedwhilereasoningiswhatwecall  
Cα托ね∬た   
Principle 2（of Compatibility）：thereis compatibility among the  
reasoningperformedindifferentcontexts．  
（GhidiniandGiunchiglia，2000and2001，p．2）  
More formally，1LiriEIis defined as afamily oflanguages defined  
over a set ofindexesl．In order to pairlocalmodelsinto a single  
uniform structure，anOtion ofa compatibility sequence cis defined as  
（Co，Cl，．．．，Ci．．．〉．AmodelinthisframeworkisacompatibilityrelationC  
Whichhasthefollowingcharacteristics：  
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l．C≠0  
2．く0，0，‥．，0，‥．〉¢C  
（GhidiniandGiunchiglia，2001，P．4）   
Satisfiablitythencanbedefinedasfollows：  
Let C＝jcl，with c＝くCo，Cl，．．．，Ci．．．〉，be a modelandi：少a  
formula．Csatisfiesi：¢，insymboIsCl＝i：≠，ifforallc∈C，CiI＝  
¢whereif，fora11m∈，mI＝c19～・   
（GhidiniandGiunchiglia，2001，p．8）  
Furthermore，  
Aformulai：¢isvalid，insymboIsl＝i：¢，ifallmodelssatisfyi：¢・   
Ghidiniand Giunchiglia（2001，p．30f）provideproofs thattheir system  
thatallowsmultiplecontexts，Multicontextsystem，iscompleteandsound  
Withrespecttoacertainmodel．   
5．BuvaぢandM孔SOm（1993）   
Buvae and Mason（1993）（cf．Buvae，Buvac and Mason1995）  
propose alogicthatformalises McCarthy’s theory ofcontext，Whichis  
called PropositionalLogic of Context（henceforth PLC）．Buvae and  
Mason（1993）showthattheirlogiciscompleteandsound．  
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Inordertoexpressacontextseenfromanothercontext，SequenCeS  
Ofcontextsaredefinedasfollows．Supposing濫＊denotethesetoffinite  
COnteXt SequenCeS and K＝Kl…tCndenote any element of K＊．Then a  
vocabularyVocab（這，¢）canbedefinedasiく這，P）i  




¢isvalidinacontextsequence這ifl壱 ≠；≠issati所ableina  
COnteXtSequenCeifthereisaPLC－mOdelMsuchthatMJ青 ≠．  
Bouquet and Serafini（2000）observe that LMSis more general  
thanPLC：Cf．Buvae andMason，1993，forthelattercanbeembeddedin  
the former．Furthermore，they state that PLC with different vocabu－  
lariesfordifferentcontextsis equivalenttoPLCwith asinglevocabu－  
1ary foral1contexts（p．23）．Eveniftheir argumentis correct，it does  
not follow that McCarthy’s theory of contextinitselfisincapable of  
allowingdifferentvocabularies．And as wehave seenin2，McCarthy’s  
OWnWOrkmakesitclearthatthecnVerSeistrue・Thereisafarmore  
problematicissue concernlng the axiom，△，Which enables one knowl－  
edge base to access another knowledge base and which，aS a reSult，  
might deny partiality that underlies the theory．As thisis more of a  
logicalproblem anditis possible to have a propositionallogic of  
COnteXtwithouttheaxiom，Ishallnotdiscussthis further：Seede Paiva  
（2003）foramoredetaileddiscussion．   
6．Buvaぢ（1995）  
Buvae（1995）offersanaccountoflexicalambiguitywhichisbased   
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on McCarthy’s theory ofcontext．He provides a prooftheory thathas  
thefollowingproperties：   






（Flat） L－1Cist（1Q，ist（Kl，¢））→ist（T（1，¢））  
【Every contextlooks the same regardless ofwhich con－  
textitisbeingviewedfrom．］   
（Enter） L－tC’：ist（K，0）  
「K：¢   
（Exit）   恒¢  
「K’：ist（K，¢）  
TheAaxiom，aSmentionedinSection5，iscontroversial，andsois  
Flatness．As thelogic without these two axiomsis conceivable，this  
does not count as a real obstacle for using the theory for natural 
languagesemantics．   
7．Discussion  
We have briefly examined three different frameworks．Each of  
them has potentialproblemsif used for analysing natura11anguage  
utterances．One reason for thisis none ofthe above mentioned theories  
incorporatesquantification．Anotherissueistheyhaveratherdifferent  
logicalproperties and arenotstrictly comparable．Forinstance，Buvac  
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and Mason（1993）use modallogic．Ghidiniand Giunchiglia，s theory  
（2000and2001）is centred around the concepts oflocality and co－  
mpatibilitywhilstMcCarthy’soriginaltheoryiscouchedinthepredi－  
Cateist，Whichis basically validity．Furthermore，nOne Of the extant  
logicsofcontextdoesnotexplicatehowcontextsareobtained；theyare  
Simply glVen’，Whichwouldnotbeasatisfactoryexplanationinnatura1  
1anguagesemantics．  
More researchis requir・ed to decide which frameworkis most  
appropriate for analyslng and representing naturallanguage expres－  
Sions・In particular，it would be usefulif one could compare co－  
mputationalcomplexityofeachloglC，forunnecessarycomplexitylSnOt  
desirable even thoughsimplisticlogics might not be able to provide  
Sufficientmechanisms．  
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